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Mujahidin in Bosnia
From Ally to Challenger
The existence of the remaining muja-
hidin, foreign Muslim warriors, in Bos-
nia following the Dayton agreement in 
1995 has occasionally been portrayed 
by Croat and Serb religious and po-
litical leaders alike as a threat towards 
their existence and coexistence in Bos-
nia. This article disputes this view and 
argues instead that mujahidin have be-
come a challenger to the Islamic lead-
ership, namely the Islamska Zajednica 
(Islamic Community), and the Hanafi 
interpretation of Islam practiced by Bosnian Muslims. The Islamic Com-
munity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in 1878, is the sole reli-
gious authority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and authorized 
to appoint imams to approximately 1,700 mosques and to provide reli-
gious education from secondary to post-graduate level.
Mujahidin entered Bosnia in 1992 through Croatia, mainly as hu-
manitarian aid workers. Although initially welcomed during an arms 
embargo in the fight against Serbian aggressors, they have gradually 
become a problem. Beside several confrontations with UN Peacekeep-
ing forces, their operations against Croat armed forces and civilians 
aggravated relations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Their em-
phasis on the religious character of the war did not only create conflict 
between the two allies (Bosnian Muslims and Croats), but also created 
tensions within local Muslim populations.
In the early 1990s, the Bosnian Muslims were at a serious disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis the Serb army which seized the ammunition of the Yu-
goslav army. In this context, the appearance of the mujahidin received 
much support, not least from Izetbegović, who was president at the 
time. However, the political anxieties triggered by 9/11 brought an end 
to this welcome. In 2002, six Bosnian citizens of Algerian origin were 
deported to Guantanamo and the accounts of ten humanitarian or-
ganizations were frozen. Since March 
2007, the government has stripped 661 
individuals of their Bosnian citizenship, 
arguing that it had been granted ille-
gally. Such incidents show that after a 
decade of cooperation the mujahidin 
have now become a nuisance to Bos-
nian Muslims, not just because they 
negatively influence the image of 
Bosnian Muslims in the eyes of non-
Muslim Bosnians and the international 
community, but also because they 
challenge the very core of Bosnian religious identity and its everyday 
representations. 
Between “brothers” and “neighbours”
Following the end of the 1992–1995 war, resulting in around 200,000 
dead, two million refugees and over 3,000 destroyed or damaged mon-
uments, the Islamska Zajednica faced the difficult task of facilitating 
understanding and confidence among the previously warring parties. 
In this context, the representatives of Croat and Serb religious and po-
litical leaders in Bosnia occasionally referred to the “increasing Islami-
zation” which they saw as a threat to their existence and to the possibil-
ity of coexistence. Although these statements have reflected a vague 
and ambiguous framework on subjects ranging from the increasing 
number of mosques to constitutional arrangements for a centralized 
state or the political statements made by Reis ul-Ulama Dr. Mustafa ef. 
Cerić, they have centred on the presence of mujahidin.
In the post 9/11 era Bosnia has been under scrutiny as a potential 
hotbed of Al-Qaida terrorism. It has been this alleged potentiality that 
has fed into anxieties and suspicions. The aforementioned statements 
started to be pronounced publicly in Bosnia in 2000. Until now three 
attacks have been committed by Salafi-oriented groups1 towards 
non-Muslim Bosnians. These were the 
murder of three members of Andelic 
family on 24 December 2002, a fight 
in Maoca on 13 March 2003, and an at-
tack on Mihajlo Kisic from Brcko on 15 
July 2006. Furthermore, “verbal provo-
cations” were reported by Serb return-
ees in the Jablanica and Gornja Maoca 
near Brćko where the settled mujahi-
din reside since they moved from Boc-
inja in central Bosnia in late 2000 and 
early 2001.
Certainly, the accusations are not 
just rhetoric: mujahidin have indeed 
used Bosnia as a battle front to fight 
“infidels” and as a training field for fu-
ture campaigns. However, a compari-
son of the extent of the incidents and 
the discourses on this “threat” reveals 
that although the relatively limited di-
rect threats to Croats and Serbs can in-
evitably give rise to anxiety, the state-
ments of a so-called Wahhabi threat in 
Bosnia towards coexistence is prima-
rily incited by the memories of the war 
and the aforementioned “potentiality,” 
which is also politically manipulated. 
For example, the Serb terrorism expert 
Darko Trifunović urged preservation of 
Cars damaged 
during post-
war communal 
tensions in 
Bocinja, Bosnia
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Rather than forming an actual terrorist threat, 
Muslim warriors in Bosnia have become 
prominent challengers to Bosnian Islamic 
leadership. By propagating Salafi teachings 
which target the forms of Islam practised by 
the Bosnian Muslims, this former ally came to 
be seen as a threat—not only because their 
presence fuelled stigmatization of Bosnia as 
a potential terrorist hotbed, but also because 
their Salafi ideas go against the very essence of 
Bosnian Muslim identity. 
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the institutions of the Serbian Republic despite the current dysfunc-
tional state structure of Bosnia “to keep a track on Muslim spies,” the 
number of which was exaggerated to 400,000 by Mihajlo Mitrović, 
another Serb terrorism expert.2 Furthermore, Serb politicians such as 
Milorad Dodik employ discourses similar to those used prior to the 
1992-95 war, such as “to prevent the creation of a Muslim state in the 
heart of Europe.”3 However, facts on the ground reveal that it has been 
particularly the Bosnian Muslims who have been challenged by their 
former allies.
Importing “true Islam” 
Following a war into which Bosnian Muslims drifted partially due 
to their religious identity, the remaining mujahidin have attempted 
to transform the dominant socio-cultural framing by further solidify-
ing and channelling the increased interest in religion in particular 
ways. The remaining humanitarian relief organizations have not only 
reconstructed destroyed mosques, but also started educational and 
publishing projects. Translated Salafi-oriented literature (such as the 
“Family Library” financed by High Saudi Committee), new magazines 
(such as SAFF published by the pro-Salafi youth organization Active 
Islamic Youth), and websites (such as www.islambosna.ba and www.
bih.org) have been the main instruments for the transmission of Salafi 
thought among Bosnian Muslims. They especially brought new cultural 
framings and related discussions into the agenda of Bosnian Muslims. 
Besides denouncing the local practices as bid‘a (religious innovations), 
such as mawlid celebrations, tawhids (commemoration rites), or rela-
tively fast performance of prayers, they also introduced visual symbols 
in public life such as niqab and long beards. Since 1992, these interpre-
tations have often caused tensions between Bosnian Muslims perform-
ing the customary, Hanafi way of rituals and those adopting a Salafi 
interpretation. 
These conflicts moved to the next stage when differences in appear-
ance and performance of rituals started to disrupt the established 
order in Bosnian mosques and evolved into physical conflicts between 
the two groups. In February 2007, the doors of the Careva Mosque were 
locked, probably for the first time in its history, to avoid clashes be-
tween the congregation and the followers of Jusuf Barčić (the deceased 
Salafi imam from Barčići) who intended to give religious lectures. Sev-
eral cases have reported “Wahhabi young men” being beaten up by 
Bosnian mosque-goers. For example, during the past Ramadan, such 
young men were beaten and thrown out of the mosque when they in-
tended to do i‘tikaf (spend time in devotion to God) in a mosque. Simi-
lar cases occurred in Barčići in March and in Sarajevo in April 2007.4 Not 
only did these intra-Muslim conflicts create impatience with the Salafi-
oriented groups, but due to such instances, the Islamska Zajednica and 
Reis-ul Ulema Cerić have now been harshly criticized for not looking 
after the Bosnian Muslims’ centuries-old trust.
The authority of the Islamska Zajednica 
While these events targeted the Bosnian interpretation of Islam and 
the authority of the Islamska Zajednica as the sole legal and traditional 
representative of the Bosnian interpretation of Islam since 1878, the 
alleged passivity of the Islamska Zajednica has also been severely criti-
cized. The critics were mainly learned Bosnian Muslims such as several 
professors at the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Husrev Beg Madra-
sa of the Islamska Zajednica in Sarajevo as well as “former Wahhabis” 
such as Jasmin Merdan.
The Islamska Zajednica, which has been criticized for not having 
taken timely measures, had indeed attempted to take the initiative in 
the midst of the war with an almost now forgotten fatwa dated 13 No-
vember 1993, concerning “the obligation of honouring the principles 
of the Hanafi madhab.”5 Despite current requests to adopt a coercive 
approach by implementing legal measures, the Islamska Zajednica 
typically tries to sustain its hegemony by legitimizing its discourse and 
reconfiguring alliances horizontally and vertically to gain the consent 
of the members of the traditional congregation, as well as followers 
of the Salafi-oriented movements. The only exception was its later re-
quest from legal authorities (resulting in a law enacted in 2006) not to 
register any organization or institution with the attribute “Islamic” in 
its name, which can be regarded as an implicit coercive instrument. 
However, the developments on the ground, revealing that this fatwa in 
1993 had been ignored by some segments of the society, opened the 
way to new initiatives. 
Rijaset, the leadership of the Islamska Zajed-
nica, issued two subsequent resolutions in March 
and November 2006.6 By these resolutions, the Is-
lamska Zajednica underlined its determinacy “to 
protect the uniqueness of the centuries-long tra-
dition of Bosnian Muslims” and support “an institu-
tional interpretation of Islam in this region, based 
on Quran and Sunna and the traditions of the 
Bosnian Muslims,” while calling “those who want 
to make interpretations outside the institutional 
set-up, perhaps some humanitarian organizations 
or others [to] harmonize their programmes with 
the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community.” 
Here, it was also stated that mosques are open to 
everyone, while approval of the imam is required 
to do “anything in an organized fashion.”
Although the Islamska Zajednica aimed to 
strengthen its leadership, it has abstained to ex-
clude the dissident individuals and groups and 
conduct a kind of witch-hunt. The Islamska Zajednica has even refused 
to name and stigmatize these dissidents, not to “repeat the mistake 
made in 1949” when the religious leadership declared some ulema and 
members of the Young Muslim association as “traitors and terrorist.” 
Cerić preferred to blame “those who have not understood the ‘Islamic 
tradition of the Bosniaks’.”7 
Beside these attempts to form a horizontal alliance at the domestic 
level, the Islamska Zajednica has also initiated a vertical alliance in syn-
onymy with the debate on so-called Euro-Islam with the initiatives of 
the Reis-ul Ulema Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerić. Following his “Declaration of Eu-
ropean Muslims” in August 2005, Cerić has portrayed the Bosnian expe-
rience as a genuine form of the European experience of Islam. This has 
also reminded Bosnian Muslims that preservation of their moderate 
stand could promote their image. Now, the mujahidin have not only 
been figures who “sowed discord” within mosques and on the streets, 
but are also an obstacle in attempts of Bosnians to regain their posi-
tive image and to be part of the house of Europe. The dissidents had 
already damaged these goals by prompting connotations of terrorism. 
However, the resolution of November 2006 was found “inadequate 
and euphemistic” by several Bosnian Muslims, such as Prof. Esad 
Duraković, professor at the Institute for Eastern Studies in Sarajevo, 
who stated that “it has not even named the threat that is looming over 
Bosnia-Hercegovina,” while “it is necessary to act more adequately 
and with more urgency.”8 Such a call for action has already been pro-
nounced by Prof. Adnan Silajdžić, who even proposed that Wahhabi 
activities in Bosnia-Hercegovina must be penalized.9 Furthermore, the 
strongest accusations came from another professor from the Faculty of 
Islamic Sciences, Rešid Hafizović, who accused the Islamska Zajednica 
of being indulgent, by delineating the situation as follows: “Bosnian 
Muslims have been infected by a new lethal virus, as a recurrence of 
the recent aggression [1992–1995 war]” which “manifests itself in the 
form of an arrogant, rigid, aggressive, and anachronistic phenomenon 
called Wahhabism.” 
From 1992 to 2007, mujahidin have changed 
from an ally to a threat in the eyes of many Bos-
nian Muslims. For over a decade the traditional 
interpretation of Islam by the Bosnian Muslims 
and their religious leadership have been the main 
targets of the Salafi ideologies of the remaining 
mujahidin in Bosnia. They have not only fuelled 
the discourses to depict Bosnia as a hotbed for 
international terrorism, but also challenged the 
very core of Bosnian religious identity and its 
main representative, the Islamska Zajednica. It is 
now the representatives of the traditional Bos-
nian interpretation of Islam who undertake the 
struggle to regain self-confidence and trust be-
fore their fellow Bosnians and Europeans. 
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[A]fter a decade 
of cooperation the 
mujahidin have 
now become a 
nuisance to Bosnian 
Muslims.
